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Abstract 
The Indonesia financial crisis in 1997 was an event waiting to happen very long before 
being precipitated by the Asian crisis. Such a collapse has its root in a development 
model imposed by a monolithically authoritarian government basically rooted on the top-
down development model, the import-based industrial development, and the non-agro 
industrialization. Any policy measures, monetary-fiscal-trade policies, adopted by the 
government were generally in favor of import-based industry, IBI, but at the expense of 
agricultural and local-based economy. Based on an approximately the same scenario, the 
country’s crisis 2015 lasted longer since the collapse of local currency starting in May 
2013. Among several differences, the most significant was the nature of capital flight. 
Such capital flight in 1997 was basically due to the major need to US dollars for foreign 
debt payment, whereas that in 2015 was principally due to remarkable economic prospect 
outside after its collapse following the Greek crisis. The adoption of dichotomy model in 
economy, protecting extremely strong dependence of the Indonesia economy on the IBI, 
sacrificing the domestic-based-industry, DBI, has been the central criticisms against the 
country’s economy as relatively unstable, centralized in Jakarta only, and having 
minimum value added. Challenging the weaknesses of such an economic model, the 
country should have been adopting the model of economic dualism positioning IBI and 
DBI as dual sectors having the same importance 
Keywords: Economic dichotomy, Economic dualism, DBI, IBI. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the earliest days of his presidency 
supported by his Cabinet, named as the 
Working Cabinet, President Joko Widodo, has 
been facing serious economic problems 
characterized by the drop in local currency. 
Such an economic collapse was in fact started 
in the mid of 2013, long before his induction, 
20 October 2014. However, continuing impact 
of that such a local currency drop has been 
lasting until the end of this year, November 
2015, without any significant symptom when 
to terminate. The Rupiah exchange rate 
dropped seriously from Rp 9,620 per US 
Dollar in January 2013 and Rp 10,333 early 
August 2013, to 12,191 at the end of 2013 
(Subekti, 2013), escalated to Rp 14,700 in 
September and down back to Rp 13, 680 per 
US Dollar, early November 2015. 
This monetary crises, reminded us of 
about the same crises right before Reformation 
Government, 1997-1998. That financial crisis 
finally followed by the downfall of the 
previous government after ruling the country 
for three decades. During this period the 
Indonesian currency seriously dropped about 
83.6 percent from Rp 2,432 in July 1997 to Rp 
14,800 per US Dollar, 24 January 1998, and 
settled down to Rp 7,450 per US Dollar, early 
2000, after escalated wildly (Jung et al, 2003). 
Only in less than fifteen years the country 
experienced two extremely devastating 
monetary crisis, the crisis ended in 2000 and 
that started in 2013. 
Such an experience of the Republic for 
having two monetary crisis within a relatively 
very short development period is a very 
interesting lesson to learn. And therefore, this 
paper is aimed at assessing qualitatively the 
ultimate reason behind the two 
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2. THE COUNTRY ECONOMY, BEFORE
2000 
The success of the country’s economic 
development in 1970s strongly supported by 
three remarkable factors, mainly, windfall 
profit from oil boom, escalating foreign loan, 
and increasing foreign direct investment, has 
been followed by the country’s success in 
industrialization, 1980s. Unfortunately, 
industrial choice of the government was made 
with an extremely strong bias to the skilled-
labor, high technology, and capital intensive 
industries, SLI-HTI-CII, which were generally 
very foreign-based in nature (Jung, et.al, 
2003). 
Logical consequence of prioritizing 
foreign-based industries or import-based 
industry, IBI, was the marginalization of 
domestic-based industries, DBI, including 
agriculture. While IBI was characterized by 
SLI-HTI-CII, DBI was marked by its ULI-
ATI-LII, unskilled-labor, appropriate-
technology, and labor intensive industries. Any 
extreme measure including monetary-fiscal-
trade policies supporting FBI would 
automatically victimize DBI. The IBI has been 
very successful at the expense of DBI. In turns, 
comparative advantage naturally blessed to 
agricultural sector has never reached its global 
competitiveness. 
It was the economic success long before 
2000. After the success, following the downfall 
of oil boom, and approaching 2000, the 
capacity to protect IBI was getting worse and 
worse due to limited foreign reserves for 
Rupiah protection and expanding need for 
foreign exchange for debt payment. These two 
had, hand in hand, shared significant 
contribution to the Indonesian monetary crisis 
1997-1998, joining the Asian crisis 
characterized by massive capital flight of 
Indonesia and the rest of Southeast Asian 
countries, following the floating of the Thai 
Baht, July 2, 1997. For Indonesia, the flight 
was even worse due to the failure of business 
sector in paying foreign debt because of 
unproductive investment decision (Jung et.al. 
2003). 
The Indonesia financial crisis 1997 was 
an event waiting to happen very long before 
being precipitated by the Asian crisis. Such a 
collapse has its root in a development model 
imposed by the monolithically authoritarian 
government for about three decades by the 
Indonesian development planner of the regime 
before the reformation era. It was basically 
rooted on the top-down development model, 
the import-based industrial development, the 
non-agro industrialization, and the rice-biased 
agricultural development (Jung et.al, 2003). 
Any policy, monetary-fiscal-trade policies, 
adopted by the government were generally in 
favor of import-based industry, IBI, but at the 
expense of agriculture in general, and local-
based economy. After victimizing DBI the 
country then did not have any exit strategy to 
survive its economy. 
3. THE ECONOMIC SUCCESS 2001-2010
General characteristics of the global 
economy 2001-2010 were not very optimistic 
in nature. Most countries were normally 
marked by minimum yearly growth rate and 
commonly rated under five percent. All over 
the world, according to Table 1, only three 
countries realizing the annual growth rate of 
above five percent, namely China, India, and 
Indonesia, at the growth rates of 11.7 percent, 
5.7 and 5.2 percent, respectively. It was not 
very surprising due to the fact that popular 
countries experienced declining growth rate, 
2001-2010, and many of them having negative 
growth rate during the second half of that 
decade following the collapse of the PIGS, a 
popular country abbreviation for Portugal, 
Ireland, Greece, and Spain. 





China 11.7 Estonia 3.8 
India 7.7 Chile 3.7 
Indonesia 5.2 Brazil 3.6 
Russia 4.9 South 
Africa 
3.5 





4.2 Israel 3.1 
Turkey 4.0 Australia 3.1 
Poland 3.9 Average 
Rest 
1.7 
        Source: Oberman, et.al. (2012) 
The story behind the progress of several 
countries including Indonesia were escalating 
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FDIs, foreign direct investments, flowing in 
the growing countries from the European 
countries, the United States, and other 
developed countries due to limited growth rate 
and strongly characterized by unstable 
economic growth. It was a significant blessing 
in disguise. Indonesia was being blessed 
massively with massive global capital inflow 
which has been very successful in providing 
remarkable growth rate as well as stabilizing 
power for the growth as it was summarized by 
Oberman et.al (2012), as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. GDP Growth, Standard Deviation, 
Annualized, 2001-2010 
Country Percent Country Percent 
Indonesia 0.9 Canada 1.8 
Australia 0.9 India 1.8 
Portugal 1.5 South 
Korea 
2.0 
Norway 1.6 Poland 2.0 














Source: Oberman, et.al. (2012) 
The economic growth of Indonesia 2001-
2010 was extremely very optimistic. However, 
due to the story behind the growth that has 
been summarized coupled with industrial 
selection of the country, the Indonesia’s 
economy was criticized as having potential 
weaknesses and risks, because of the facts that 
such economic progresses were strongly 
influenced by the economic collapse of the 
other parts of the globe. To mention a few, 
popular criticisms were: (i) economy is 
relatively unstable, (ii) growth is centralized in 
Jakarta only, (iii) Indonesia follows the Asia 
Tiger’s export-driven growth model, (iv) main 
economic driver is resources, and (v) growth 
has come largely from an expanding workforce 
(Oberman, et.al, 2012; Budiman, 2012).  
It was very unfortunate that those five 
best criticisms containing meaningful lessons 
to learn were nullified by many Indonesian 
economists including Oberman at. al. (2012) 
from McKinzey Global Institute, economic 
advisory team to the Palace. Instead of 
adopting such the best lessons, Oberman et.al 
called them as irrelevant but a set of economic 
myths for Indonesia by providing their 
subjective rationality behind as the Palace 
Economic Adviser (Maksum, 2014). 
Maksum (2014) explained further that due 
to IBI-biased, supported by raw material-based 
export strongly shouldered by expanding 
workforce, have made the country’s economy 
highly dependent on foreign countries and, 
therefore relatively unstable. Whereas, IBI-
biased strongly indicted the significant position 
of Jakarta and surrounding areas to be the 
growth centers leaving outer cities generally, 
and particularly outer island under developed. 
The potential for having unstable and 
centralized growth is not debatable.  
Remaining criticisms, mentioning natural 
resources and expanding workforce as the 
drivers of economic growth of this nation were 
also very excellent criticisms. Natural resource 
dominance in export clearly indicated that 
meaningful added value of natural resources as 
well as human resources have been very 
minimum. This country has been donating 
remarkably huge amount of value added from 
natural as well as agricultural resource sector 
to their industrial processing outside Indonesia. 
Historical evidences also showed very clearly 
that the impact of IBI over-protection, resulted 
in significant competitiveness of DBI, 
especially ABI, agro-based industry, in 
producing raw material, directly lost their 
competitiveness.  
He is also in agreement in accepting the 
first criticism based on the fact that the 
Indonesia’s growth has been based on overall 
over-protective measures covering monetary, 
fiscal and trade policies, for the success of the 
IBI. Due to this protective measure therefore, 
the economy has been very dependent upon 
foreign economy.  This view was supported by 
the weakening of Rupiah starting July 2013 
(Maksum, 2012 and 2013). Furthermore, 
Maksum (2014) claimed that shifting from FBI 
to DBI and ABI would potentially guarantee 
the country’s economic self-sufficiency, and in 
turns its growth stability. 
The argument against the criticism 
mentioning that the growth is centralized in 
Jakarta only was very misleading. The use of 
the growth rate in developing the argument 
was not very suitable, based on the fact that the 
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rate was the comparison between additional 
values gained during that period divided by 
initial value. Initial value of Jakarta economy 
is extremely huge and offsetting additional 
value in providing rate. Whereas, the absolute 
increase of the Jakarta economy is factually 
dominates Indonesia’s growth and strongly 
concentrates the growth in Jakarta only. 
Decentralization of the growth to the outer 
Jakarta and the outer island would only be 
possible if, and only if, the country’s 
development policy be reoriented to local 
potential based on the local and the sexiest 
resources, ABI, agricultural-based industry. 
In response to the remaining criticisms, 
the strongest driving force of the growth from 
natural resource and expanding workforce, 
should have been taken into serious account 
considering the fact that this country has been 
growing very fast through the support of the 
less added value of important export 
commodities, while consuming high value of 
imported goods being processed from this 
country’s exported commodities. Significant 
political revolution towards better value 
chains, changes and processes of local 
products, DBI-ABI, would be extremely 
meaningful in providing value added to natural 
resources and individual workforce. 
Considering the above description, 
therefore, it is very proud to claim that 
decentralizing and stabilizing the growth 
would only be made possible and guaranteed 
through ABI development. In addition to that, 
ABI would significantly support the nation in 
simultaneously providing the more appropriate 
pro: growth-job-poor-green development 
model, wherein the Working Cabinet, “Kabinet 
Kerja” is mainstreaming. Operational 
paradigm of “Kabinet Kerja” in mainstreaming 
food sovereignty could be taken as appropriate 
example. The only need nowadays is the 
existence of the true political-economic will to 
follow. 
4. THE ECONOMY IN DISARRAY:
BEYOND 2010 
Five global criticisms on the Indonesia’s 
economic growth, 2001-2010, could be seen as  
perfectly a set of myths due to the global 
economic recession precipitated by the PIGS, 
Portugal-Ireland-Greece-Spain, during the 
second half of the last decade, 2001-2010. 
However, very careful attention should have 
been properly formulated in response to 
possible renovation of the recession into global 
economic progress of the European countries 
and the US that could possibly be realized not 
any longer. This inflection point in time could 
mean serious calamity to the progress of 
economic growth in the decade after. 
The symptomatic threat of massive capital 
flight started by the end of 2012. The country 
has been facing serious economic problems 
threatened by the drop in local currency. Such 
an economic collapse came into being in the 
mid of 2013. Continuing impact of such a local 
currency drop has been lasting until the end of 
this year, November 2015, without any 
significant symptom when to terminate. The 
Rupiah exchange rate dropped seriously from 
Rp 9,620 per US Dollar in January 2013 and 
Rp 10,333 early August 2013, to 12,191 at the 
end of 2013 (Subekti, 2013), escalated to Rp 
14,700 in September and down back to Rp 
13,680 per US Dollar, early November 2015. 
Such a significant drop of local currency 
exchange rate of approximately 40.20 percent, 
2013-2015, with no terminating indication has 
off course made the country’s economy in 
disarray. Massive capital inflow and FDIs the 
decade before dramatically changed beyond 
2010, into massive capital outflow and 
escalated the excessive demand for US 
Dollars. Supported by other need, and coupled 
with several political as well as speculative 
measures, the decrease in the Rupiah exchange 
rate becoming more and more dramatic, and 
jumped down into Rp 14,700 per US Dollars, 
before recovered back approaching the end of 
2015. 
Again, the statistics proved the fact that 
over dependent upon foreign-based economy 
as well as import-based industry, IBI, based on 
over-protective measures in favor of them, at 
the expense of DBI, has made the country’s 
economy jumped down to its lowest level. As 
far as Rupiah exchange rate is concerned, the 
jump reached more than 40 percent during the 
last three years only. The latest fact 
strengthened the reminder raised long before 
that marginalizing DBI and particularly 
agricultural sector as the local potential of the 
common, for the sake of IBI industrialization 
has been very risky. 
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5. TOWARDS ECONOMIC DUALISM
After assessing the inter-temporal 
economic performance of the Republic of 
Indonesia, before 2000, 2001-2010, and 
beyond 2010, several remarks could be taken 
as a serious lessons to learn for the purpose of 
taking prior recommendation needed to 
develop the nation more appropriately without 
blaming any regime under any political 
configuration. Time has been changing all 
over. Specific political configuration was 
always being dictated by its own mission and 
perspective. However, common lessons 
learned could be outlined in the followings. 
The first lesson commonly characterizing 
the economic performance was the spirit for 
having the country’s industrialization to take 
off, running after developed countries, 
especially after being blessed with oil boom 
windfall profit long before 2000. The second, 
the selection of industrial sector being 
prioritized was just the same all over the 
periods, even during this Reformation 
Government, which is prioritizing HTI, SLI, 
and CII, and concentrated very extremely on 
IBI, through overall over-protective measures, 
monetary-fiscal-trade and other policies.  
The third lesson showed that such 
protective policies were very remarkably in 
favor of IBI, but at the same time, it must be 
accepted that it was at the expense of local 
economic potential, supported by natural 
resources and agricultural sector, commonly 
owned by every province in the Republic. The 
forth, the ultimate consequence of such an 
economic dichotomy, over-protecting IBI and 
at the same time marginalizing DBI, was the 
absence of exit strategy in anticipating any 
economic obstacles of the country. It could be 
easily observed that massive foreign earning 
should have been realized from agricultural 
export during currency crisis, was not been 
realized into being. 
The fifth lesson, proved the fact that this 
country has been very long being trapped by its 
economic dichotomy policy which very fragile, 
over-dependent upon foreign countries, and 
proven to be relatively unstable. The seventh, 
as the consequence of such a dichotomy 
marginalizing local potential, the economy is 
being more and more concentrated in Jakarta 
only without meaningful economic growth 
outside Jakarta in general, and particularly 
outside Java. Relatively unstable, centralized 
in Jakarta, and at minimum value added, were 
common denominator characterizing the 
country’s economy all over the economic 
periods concerned. 
Based on the fact that economic 
dichotomy protecting massively the IBI is very 
much misleading, but acknowledging the 
impossibility of switching back to local sector 
dominated by the DBI and at the same time 
marginalizing IBI due to its dominance for the 
days, therefore, combining IBI and DBI under 
economic dualism policy would be the only 
alternative to survive the future of the 
Indonesian economy. Meaningful attention for 
developing DBI through agro-industrial 
development would consequently stabilize and 
decentralize the country’s economic growth, 
and at the same time providing necessary value 
added for both the natural resource based 
industry as well as the unskilled labor intensive 
industry (Maksum, 2014). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The economic policy strongly based upon 
sectorial dichotomy has been adopted by the 
Republic of Indonesia has been proven to be 
ineffective, if not misleading, in providing a 
relatively stable and decentralized growth 
among regions, communities and among 
people. Such a dichotomy between IBI and 
DBI has seriously spread sectorial injustice 
within its national development. Due to this 
fact therefore, such a dichotomy have to be 
terminated to end unjust development. 
Shifting from such a dichotomy, 
promoting IBI while at the same time 
marginalizing DBI, towards economic dualism 
promoting both IBI and DBI very fairly could 
be recommended as alternative solution to 
renovate the country’s economy. This selection 
would be strongly guaranteed by its economic 
power to stabilize and decentralize the growth, 
and at the same time provided an extra size of 
development bread sharable by the country’s 
provinces and population.  
Knowing the fact that poverty alleviation 
has been long live development program of 
this country at any political configuration, 
therefore, the shift from IBI to IBI-DBI, would 
be proper development model promoting DBI 
with its economic power in providing the pro: 
poor-job-people-green development model 
guaranteeing many other development 
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objectives. It could be summarized then, that 
stabilizing and decentralizing the growth 
would only be possible via DBI.   
The globe is changing. The Working 
Cabinet of Jokowi-JK Government has been 
proclaiming as mainstreaming, among others, 
on food and agro industry development. Legal 
standings have been formulated, and politically 
support the established Cabinet. However, they 
would never be sufficient unless being strongly 
supported by consistent political will of 
Jokowi-JK. However, the justifiability of the 
Cabinet would only be possible through the 
shift from IBI formerly adopted by previous 
regimes towards IBI and DBI as development 
dualism which have been popularized by 
Jokowi-JK during Presidential Election. 
This shift needs no remarkable economic 
trade off, especially based on the country’s 
macroeconomic perspective. Moreover, DBI 
promotion would deeply acknowledge the 
blessing from the Almighty for abundantly 
available resource endowment, natural and 
human capitals. 
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